



































































t h e p u z z l e s o f r a c i a l n a t i o n h o o d
Mara LOVEMAN, National Colors: Racial Classification and the State in
Latin America (New York, Oxford University Press, 2014)
Without wishing to recover a tired cliche of “civic” v. “ethnic”, this
fine comparative sociology of 300 years of classifying and counting
people by race in Latin America suggests that, next to the much-
belabored civic and ethnic models of nationhood, known especially
from the European context, there is a third alternative for building
and integrating national societies: racial nationhood. It consists of the
idea of “race mixture,” the regenerative, progress-promising mixing
and blending of the racially diverse settler, immigrant and indigenous
populations that make up the societies of Latin America. But the more
interesting contrast is not with Europe, where “race” has simply been
a non-flyer for nation-building, but with the United States. Here, next
to its northern model of race-blind egalitarian democracy eulogized by
Tocqueville, there has been a southern model of racially divisive
Herrenvolk democracy as competing, and for all too long, predominant
nation-building project. At least since Frank Tannenbaum’s classic
comparison of race and slave systems in the Americas,1 comparative
sociologists and historians of race have been puzzled by the starkly
different experiences of the United States, where race has served to
lastingly and categorically divide and exclude people, up to the present
day, as not a few would argue, and south of the border, where race
from the start has served the exact opposite function of inclusion,
most extravagantly in the Mexican notion of raza cosmica (cosmic
race).
What does National Colours add to this picture? This study
purports to resolve three “puzzles” surrounding racial nationhood:
first, why did postcolonial Latin American states, beholden to a Re-
publican ideology, happily continue to classify by race in the early 19th
century, thus prolonging the Spanish colonial legacy that they heartily
detested; secondly, why did “race” suddenly disappear from the census
around the mid-20th century; and, thirdly, why is it having a mighty
come-back in the early 21st century? Loveman offers one common
answer to these developments: they were “driven by politics” [8]. This
1 Frank Tannenbaum, Slave and Citizen. Boston: Beacon Press 1946.
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is, I submit, a bland answer. But to her rescue, what more could one
reasonably say, in fact, about almost anything in the human theatre?
Moreover, underneath the bland logo of “politics” plausible explan-
ations are provided for all three developments.
Instead, my main quibble is different: I would not call at least two
of the three developments tackled in this book “puzzles” to begin
with. Strictly speaking, a puzzle is something unexpected or perplex-
ing given the current state of knowledge. But every student of
comparative race relations, even one not familiar with Latin America
(which, of course, is an unlikely creature to meet because a comparison
of the Americas is what much of the field consists of), would exactly
expect this outcome: for much of the 19th and early 20th centuries,
“race” was everywhere an official way of classifying people and
ordering political life, and it would be strange to expect Latin
American states to be exempted from this doxa; then race went
underground in the post-WWII era of internationally codified uni-
versal human rights; only to be recovered as identity option, as well as
remedial policy target, in the current era of multiculturalism. Appar-
ently, what Loveman finds puzzling––for the sake of academic
etiquette, I suspect––is not really so, at least if one does not expect
Latin America to stay immune from international trends. This is not
to say that she does not deliver fact-filled, well-observed, and nuanced
historical accounts, much of it on the basis of original data. They are
worth the read and make this book an important contribution.
Let’s proceed in the chronological order that structures the book.
Loveman begins with a compellingly dark picture of colonial Spain’s
“casta system,” in which indigenous people were classified as mere
“resources”, mostly for the purposes of coercive labor. This system,
a transplantation of Castile’s status-based fueros into the colonies, was
of a mercantile logic, where according to uti possidetis the size and
fixity of colonial populations determined the colonizers’ claim to
territory [49]. The castas made for an astoundingly complex formal
racial taxonomy, each element of it endowed with a distinct set of legal
privileges and—for the multitude—liabilities. Interestingly, however,
Indians, if mixing with Spaniards, would be assimilated by the third
generation, while for blacks (owing their presence to slavery) this
possibility did not exist. Accordingly, an Indian mixing with a Span-
iard in the first generation would produce a mestizo; if the mestizo met
a Spaniard in the second generation, the result would be a castizo; but
if the castizo mated a Spaniard in the third generation, the offspring
was—a Spaniard! By contrast, the unluckier black linking up with
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a Spaniard would produce a mulato; a mulato and a Spaniard made for
a morisco; if a morisco procreated with a Spaniard in the third
generation, we get a torna atras; but the torna atras mixing with
a Spaniard in the fourth round would yield a tente en al aire (literally:
suspended-in-air), who was—a mulato! So there was no escape from
permanent second-class status for the offspring of black slaves—even
if, as Loveman reports, the status of “white” could be bought in the
late 18th century (an option though for only a “few”). In all, the
Spaniards excelled as champions of racial geometry.
Against this backdrop, it indeed may appear “puzzling” that this
game continued after the revolution. The Creole nationalists, with
a “proper liberal face” [81], who emerged victorious from the in-
dependence wars of the early 1800s, and who set out to create
“national citizenries” of formally equal “Chileans,” “Peruvians,”
etc., would continue to include a race question in their decennial
census, the latter having become by the mid-1850s the badge of
modern nation-stateness. So of Loveman’s three “puzzles,” this one
comes closest to being one—at least from a purely domestic perspec-
tive, bracketing the international context of ascendant race science and
official racism. Thickening the plot, the post-colonial counting by race
occurred against the recommendation by the International Statistics
Congress (isc), in its first convention in 1853. Founded by the famous
Belgian statistician Adolphe Quetelet to standardize the modernist
quest for his nation-constituting “Average Man” across countries, the
isc later even eschewed the proxies of language and religion to avoid
“primordial” hatred and violence [94]. Why did Latin American states
not heed the statisticians’ call for racial abstention? First, Loveman
intriguingly shows that Latin American states, despite lacking the
requisite infrastructure and faring only peripherally, if at all, in the
increasingly influential international statistical community, enthusias-
tically embraced the census, because this made them categorically
similar and comparable to the advanced nation-states of Europe and
the United States. But, secondly, nationhood is not only a template
prescribing similitude; there has to be particularity too. And Latin
American particularity came through the pursuit of a “hybrid”
approach on the race question, prescribing “racial mixture” as
alternative to German-style ethnic and French-style civic nationhood.
Again: this was the age of official racism and race science, in which
Arthur de Gobineau and others had propagated that racial mixing
bred degeneracy. But from this optic Latin America, where race
mixing under the Spanish and Portuguese colonizers had a long
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pedigree, had to appear inferior. Revaluing the stigma, the Latin
American answer was that, on the contrary, race mixing was re-
generative and progress-enhancing. Through inserting race questions
in periodically held censuses, Latin American states could show that
because of gradually diminishing black and Indian numbers their
societies were inevitably marching into a “whiter” and “lighter” future
(obviously, blacks could now be assimilated, much in contrast to the
colonial past—how and why that interesting turnaround happened one
does not learn in this book). Naturally, in the age of racism Latin
Americans could not be post- or anti-racist, “better” people, as it
were. The hope of being whitened over time through mixing rested on
the “presumption of a natural hierarchy of races” [170], which Latin
American elites shared with those further north and in Europe.
From the 1950s, when race science and biological determinism had
lost their legitimacy cache, Latin America simply moved with the
winds of time, replacing “race” with “culture” questions in the census.
Cuba and Brazil alone resisted the trend—Cuba in a polemical clinch
with the United States, to demonstrate through its race figures the
lack of racial inequality; and Brazil, in anticipation of things to come,
being captured “by activists concerned with racial inequality” [245].
This second puzzle in Loveman’s triplet is much less of a “puzzle”
than the first. Importantly, this was the moment that mistizaje
“replaced whitening as the official national ideal” [232], so that racial
nationhood proper moved into place. The “Indians,” who previously
had often been counted separately to express their non-belonging to
the nation, were now included but still set to disappear, through the
census-attested diminishing number of people living on dirt floors,
chewing coca leaves, or walking barefoot—the cultural markers of
Indianness at the time. Blacks even “eclipsed from view” entirely
because they could not be captured by registering cultural and
behavioral characteristics.
Finally, in the age of multiculturalism and identity politics, we
arrive at the last but smallest of the three puzzles in this book, the
contemporary “resurgence of official ethnoracial classifications”
throughout Latin American states. Loveman calls it a “tectonic,
ideological shift” [308]. The metaphor incidentally attests to a limita-
tion of her “politics explains all” demarche because tectonic plates,
whatever they are in human affairs, are surely larger and other than
politics. This is not to say that what is said in this respect is
implausible. Loveman shows how a “confluence of domestic and
international processes” resuscitated race in terms of “cultural liberty”
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that the state now has to respect or even further. By 2013, only 6 of the
totality of 19 Latin American states covered in her book did not
recognize diversity in their constitutions, and—helped by an interna-
tional human rights regime strongly going into this direction in the
mid-1990s—the protection of indigenous rights became the center-
piece of this trend. If Loveman had taken note of Will Kymlicka’s
remarkably somber swan song of “global multiculturalism”,2 she
would have to concede that Latin America was not simply mirroring
the international trend in this respect but rather “exceptional,” as
Kymlicka argued. Whereby, I concede, we again arrive at a “puzzle” of
sorts, though not one on Loveman’s radar, who simply deems the
Latin Americans as copying the others. But this is not so. Western
Europe was in a full retreat from multiculturalism by then, while the
postcolonial states of Asia and Africa had never embraced it in the first
place. Leaving aside the quibble, the important matter is: to the
degree that multiculturalism continues to ride high in Latin America,
“mestizaje” is giving way to “multiethnicity” as dominant state norm,
thus putting in question nothing less than the entire Latin American
alternative of racial nationhood. In addition, as Loveman notes in
a deft footnote, it is doubly ironic that Latin America seems to be
moving away from the idea of mixed race at the very moment that the
United States, in its latest census, is set to embrace it. Visibly irritated
by the trend, Loveman registers the limitations of all sorts of minority
groups, including blacks, vying for “indigenous status,” because this is
the dominant game in town and at the international (UN) plane. And
she finishes her impressive 300-year review of southern-hemisphere
census-taking and race with the suspicion that “public backlash”
against multiculturalism is on the horizon even in the Latin American
exception. But among the more eyebrow-raising pieces of her book are
those about the vanguards of global capitalism, including the World
Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, pushing for a “new
international norm of multicultural nationhood” [297], making the
kow-towing to the maxims of “cultural liberty” and “development
with identity” the hard condition for handing-out dollars.
National Colors is without doubt a major contribution to the
literature on comparative race relations, and it is likely to remain
the book of reference for anyone interested in the Latin American
politics of race and census-taking for years to come. What one misses
in it is a more pronounced and systematic comparative grid, either
2 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007.
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inter- or intra-American. In fact, to the degree that this work is
comparative, it is mostly in a longitudinal sense, with the main cross-
national contrast-drawing being between Latin America combined
and the United States. Alas, this inter-American contrast-drawing is
mostly indirect and anecdotal, relegated to preface and footnotes. And
aren’t there stronger variations within Latin America, which would
have allowed its states to be grouped into distinct clusters? National
cases are mostly cited when illustrating an argument or pointing to an
anomaly. This is perfectly fine and legitimate for the author’s chosen
purpose of homing in on the three central (temporal!) puzzles. But
there is an air of randomness surrounding the use of cases, leaving
“Latin America” a bit of a mash, with a limited story-line. In the end I
asked myself, what have I learned? While filled with often original
information, the book’s informational value is limited by the constant,
not always transparent, febrile jumping from country to country
vignette. Perhaps we are touching here the limits of qualitative
comparison, because the N is so large. Nineteen cases, and not just
the usual two or three, are just too many to compare, at least within
the in-depth qualitative design that the author has opted for. Might
less have been more?
C H R I S T I A N J O P P K E
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